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Some scholars (the studies of most recent moderate Turkish scholars) have argued that development of Kurdish nationalism was largely a reaction to the rise of Turkish nationalism with growing emphasis on Turkish ethnicity and language. In contrast, the emergence of Kurdish nationalism as a political force can be traced back to a century earlier when the Kurdish nationalism were increasingly dissatisfied with the centralizing policies of the Ottoman Empire since the mid-nineteenth century. Thus, both the Ottoman and the newly formed Turkish republic have used all religious and secular justifications, in order to suppress the Kurdish national movement for more a century. The Ottoman patriotism (nation of Islam) and the modern form of Turkish nationalism have left no opportunity for the free expression of a separate Kurdish identity. In sum, the primary internal cause of ethnic conflict (Kurdish question) in Turkey is a legacy of authoritarian tradition of Ottoman Empire and the strict application of the Kemalist concept of nation-state, which defines the Turkish nation of sum citizens without consideration of ethnic identity and negates in its legal interpretation the existence of ethnic minorities.

In line with this argument, two scholars (Kemal Kirisci and Gareth Winrow) have produced a detailed analysis of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey. They begin by setting this case in context of the general scholarly literature on nationalism and ethnicity, as well as against the historical background of the multiethnic Ottoman Empire. They compare the Kurds in turkey with the Basques in Spain, nothing that the comparison is weakened by the fact that the Basques occupy a highly industrialized and prosperous region, while the Kurds have historically lived in a remote, backward, and poverty-stricken areas. The author's lack of material deprivation among the Basques, violence continues to characterize the most radical militants among them; this obviously does not provide a reassuring model for the Kurds, at least from the Turkish point of view.

While the Turkish nationalism was relatively successful in neutralizing religious opposition, there were massive uprisings from the parts of the mainly populated areas of eastern Turkey. The greatest challenges to the newly formed Republic was the major rebellion in spring 1925 led by the Kurdish religious leader Shaikh Said Piran. The origin of this revolt may be traced to the establishment of a Kurdish nationalist party called Azadi (May 1923). Clearly, most of the leaders who were involved in the Sheikh said rebellion including him, were very conscious of their distinct Kurdish identity and had articulated a separatist political agenda. In contrast, the Turkish scholars have pointed out "it seems that religion was an important distinguishing characteristic of Kurdishness at a time when the reforms of the Turkish government were seen to be undermining Islam. When referring to Turkish government troops, it was not surprising that Sheikh Said had declared 'in terms of religious law killing one Turk was worth more than killing seventy infidels" (kirisci and Windrow, 1997: 104). On the other hand, some historians like Robert Olson and W. F. Tucker disagree with Turkish scholars who characterized the rebellion "religious?instigated by reactionaries, who happened to be Kurds, they say, "the Sheikh Said rebellion was the first large-scale nationalist rebellion by Kurds". And they go on to say that "Sheikh said was an ardent nationalist" (Olson, 1989:127-131). Eventually, the rebellion was suppressed by Ankara with a great deal of violence, Sheikh Said and many others were tried and summarily executed special tribunals called the Independence Tribunals.

The importance of the Dersim rebellion (1937 - 38)

Rebellion in the name of Kurdish nationalism recurred several times in the wake of the defeat of the Sheikh Said. The most important rebellion in the wake of all these defeats was in 1937-38, based around the Kizilbas heartland of Dersim, itself part of a region marked for total evacuation by Ankara (Kendal 1982: 67). The Dersim rebellion was led by the local traditional Kizilbas elites, at the head of whom stood Seyt Riza, chief of the Abbasusagi tribe (Kendal, 1982: 68). Local intellectual cadres also played a role in the riding's leadership, according to one source. Seyt Riza and other Dersimli leaders had already drawn up a list of demands, including: orders for the arrest of the assassin of Seyt Riza's son, a halt to the massing of the Turkish military guard in the region; a halt to the construction of bridges and the of creation of the new districts; a halt to the collection of arms by Turkish authorities; and continuation of the payment of taxes on merchandise to Dersimlis (Kendal, 1982: 240-241). A letter also sent by Dersim's rebellion leaders to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations in November 1937 details what it claimed were measures taken by Turkish authorities: to deprive Kurdish children even of a basic education in Turkish-language schools; to prevent Kurds becoming officers in the Turkish army or becoming employed in civil posts 'in the Kurdish region'; to eliminate all references to 'Kurd' or 'Kurdistan' from scientific works; to force Kurds into slave labour in construction projects; to deport and disperse 'another part of the Kurds'; to 'uproot young Kurdish women and girls from their families and place them in illegal concubine'; and 'finally to Turkify a part of the Kurdish nation and to exterminate the other part, through different means' (Dersimi, 1988: 299-303). The alleged 'tyrannies of the Turkish government against human rights', aside, what is notable here is the definition, in a letter by traditional Dersim tribal chieftains, of the plight of Dersim's inhabitants being 'a part of the Kurdish nation' (Dersimi, 1988: 301).

The Dersim rebellion also was never to receive any outside assistance against the Kemalists' determined military onslaught. Finally, a top-secret 4 May 1938 decision of the Turkish cabinet resolved that Turkish military forces which had previously been massed in the area would attack Kurdish regions, and: "This time all the people in the area will be collected and deported out of the area and this collection operation will attack the villages without warning and collect the people. To do this, we will collect the people as well as the arms they have. At the moment, we are ready to deport 2,000 people (Besikci, 1991:80-81). It was also resolved in this same decision to respond to any armed resistance by rendering such opposition 'incapable of movement on the spot and until the end', to destroy the houses of such resisters, and to deport the remainder of their families. Besikci asks why the decision does not read as an instruction to the military simply to deport all such families. He concludes that this is because it is clear that the true meaning of the euphemism rendering the rebels 'incapable of movement' was to kill them (Besikci, 1991: 81).

The Dersim uprising is generally considered to have ended in 1938, but some scholars have pointed out that fighting continued into following year. The Kemalist military did not occupy the whole of Dersim until the end of 1938. The Turkish authorities made extensive use of warplanes, to bomb and strafe Dersimili targets. According to a Kurdish participant in the uprising, after aircraft bombed villages, villagers ran out of the villages and were then frequently cut down by the Turkish military. One of many examples given by this source occurred in the Kozluca area, in mid-1937. The wife and extended family of Seyt Riza were included in this group of mostly women and children fleeing Turkish airplanes. The soldiers surrounded the villagers and began putting them to death. About 11000, defenceless villagers were killed (dersimi, 1988: 287). Seyt Riza was himself captured by the Kemalists on 5 September 1937 and was hanged, together with ten of his lieutenants, on 18 November (Frnaz, 1986: 142). Kurdish nationalists firmly believe that, immediately before his death, Seyt Riza made the following speech: 'I am 75 years old. I am becoming a martyr; I am joining the Kurdistan martyrs. Kurdish youth will revenge. Down with oppressors! Down with the fickle and liars! (Dersimi, 1988: 229-303). This was the most devastating political defeat until that point for the forces fighting in the name of 'Kurdish nationalism'. The Kurdish national movement was shattered for the next three decades. Retribution by Turkish forces claimed at least 40,000 Dersimili, who were deported and massacred following this defeat (Kendal, 1982: 68).

An important discussion has been going on since 1930 (following the defeat of Dersim rebellion) among the Kemalist circle of the Turkish government. Should roads, schools, and water pipes be build in the Turkish Kurdistan, or will that only accelerate the awakening of national sentiments among the Kurds? Because of fear for that latter, no investment or development was carried out throughout the years of single party rule in Turkey. From 1950 onwards, roads, schools, and other social services began to be introduced, accompanied by the application of assimilation policies to prevent any Kurdish national awakening. In fact, these assimilation policies have always been enforced, although it can be seen that they are more rigorously enforced in the aftermath of frequent military coups. In Turkey, every time there is military coup, two subjects are brought to the forefront. One is land reform, and the other is the intensification of the assimilation process (Besikci, 1991: 79). The desire for land reform, is actually based on the misconception that it is the landlords (Aghas) who are inciting and provoking the Kurdish national movement in Turkey. According to this mentality, Kurdish identity can be eradicated at its source by exiling the tribal leaders and confiscating their land. As Besikci has pointed out, "Following the military coup of 27 May 1960, the subject of land reform was widely debated by the universities, periodical press, and political parties" (Besikci, 1991: 80). Around the time, the Kurdistan Democratic Party under the leadership of Mulla Mustafa Barzani and commenced a struggle for national liberation in Southern Kurdistan (Iraqi Kurdistan), a fact which created great anxiety amongst the members of the National Unity Committee of Turkey. Barzani was known to be a landowner (agha), tribal chief, and sheikh as well. Due to fear that similar activities would soon spread to the Turkish Kurdistan.

The Ataturk's vision of the modern Turkey

After Ataturk death in November 1938, his personality cult, if anything, grew even greater. The republican people's party (created by Ataturk in 1924) statutes were changed to make him "the eternal party chairman" (Gunter, 1997: 7). It seems that his successors sought to legitimize themselves in his shadow. Even since reformulating or questioning some of the basic tenets of the Kemalist political and racial policies became equated with political disloyalty. The Turkish scholars have argued that Ataturk inspired the Turkish people with his vision of modern, secular, independent, and ultimately democratic Turkey. The authoritarianism was a necessary means to achieve an ultimate goal. In contrast, the Turkish nationalists (means Kemalists) did not believe in the equality of peoples within the modern Turkey. Every effort was made to destroy the ethnic entities of the non-Turkish ethnic groups and to assimilate (Turkicise) them. For this reason there is nothing democratic about the concepts of the modern Turkish state and Ataturk nationalism (Besikci, 1991: 34). In sum, the fundamental aim of official ideology in Turkey in relation to the question of Kurdistan is to deny the national and democratic rights of the Kurds.
Since the early days of the newly formed Republic Mustafa Kemal and his leadership was searching for a new ideological framework which could have mass appeal. The solution that they adapted was to emphasize Turkish ethnicity and language as an alternative source of mobilization. In the early 1930, this state-sponsored policy manifested itself in the introduction of the "Turkish History Thesis" and "Sun-Language Theory". The Turkish History Thesis claimed that all the world's civilizations had been founded by the Turks; because of climatic conditions; the Turks spread all over the world from Central Asia (Besikci, 1991:19). In many places around the world this thesis claimed that the Turkish people established civilizations: the Chinese, Indian, Mesopotamian, Iranian, Greek, Roman, Egyptian and so on. The Sun-Language Theory was based on the argument that only one language, Turkish, was spoken in Central Asia. According to the theory, all the world's languages had derived from Turkish (Kirisci and Winrow, 1997:103-104). The university professors and the writers who attempted to "prove" the veracity of these views were given moral and material supports. The application of both theories to the Kurdish issues in Turkey was queried. All the world's civilizations were founded by the Turks. The ones called "Kurds" must have been some who settled in Mesopotamia. The roots, the origin of all world's languages, were Turkish. The world's languages had evolved from Turkish. Once the veracity of this theory was proven, the claim that there was no distinct language called Kurdish became self-evident. In line with this conclusion, Kirsci and Winrow have pointed out that "this 'scientific' reality was to be instilled into the hearts and minds of 'confused' Kurds. Accordingly, Kurds were 'mostly comprised of Turks who had changed their language' and the term Kurd 'was the name of a community that spoke a broken Persian and that lived in Turkey, Iraq and Iran" (Kirisci and Winrow, p. 103). Therefore, there should be no surprise that the official line of Turkish government has been to deny the existence of a Kurdish minority for seventy years.

With the suppression of the last of the rebellions in the 1920s and 1930s, the Kurdish national movement in Turkey went through a period of silence and transformation. The official state ideology and the state's approach toward the Kurdish question in Turkey did not change and the weakness of Kurdish nationalism (factional division and lack of a cohesive national leadership) gave way to a period of tranquil political activity centred on the educational opportunities offered by the state's assimilationist policies. Nicole and Huge Pope have described this period when they wrote "until 1965, foreigners were banned from even travelling to the south-east. Troops, barracks, government headquarters, police stations and prisons studded the southern landscape. Local Kurdish names of villages were changed to anodyne Turkish equivalents. Fines were introduced for speaking Kurdish public. In sum, the Kurds were relegated to the status of 'mountain Turks' (Nicole and Huge Pope, 1997:251). Yet through all the long years of repression, the Kurds in Turkey have still managed to retain their national identity and their separate culture, and to keep live the hope of autonomy, at least, for their provinces (Kurdish-populated provinces). In recent years the very harshness of their environment and the economic deprivation they have suffered, allied to the geography of the region, have played a part in the upsurge of nationalism which has its violent expression in the bloody war being waged since the mid-1980s.

In the post-World War Two period a Kurdish ethnic awareness emerged in Turkey. Some Turkish scholars have argued that the revival of Kurdish nationalism was the product of the further modernization and democratic achievements of society in Turkey. The transition from a single to a multi-party system with competitive elections increased popular participation in politics. In contrast, the ethnic awareness among the Kurds in Turkey was related to the new social and political developments in other parts of Kurdistan. Following the falling of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad (by Iranian government in 1946), conflict between the old and new broke out on early 1950s in the Kurdish political parties. By the mid-1960s, leftist tendencies developed in the leadership of Kurdistan Democratic parties of Iran and Iraq, and by the end of that decade Marxist-Leninist organizations had emerged. It coincided with the return to Iraq of the Kurdish legendary leader Mustafa Barzani after eleven years exile in Soviet Union which rekindled the dormant hopes of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey (Barkey and Fuller, 1998: 14). Thus, it seems logical to argue that this politicalized Kurdish population were the outcome of a century long suppression, deportation, and humiliation by the Turkish state.

Clearly, the so-called "democratic decade" (1950-1960) brought relative freedom of expression that allowed all, including Kurds, to articulate their grievance. This also gave people more civil rights, the universities greater autonomy, and permitted students to organize their own associations. In this environment, some Kurds began to be increasingly aware of their ethnicity. However, it is crucial to mention that civil society and democratization in Turkey had benefit mostly for the newly emerging Kurdish bourgeoisie. The new Turkish relative democratic experience means: the exiled Kurdish land-lords were given back their property in return for delivering the votes of their feudal subjects to the Government. In this so called democratic environment, Kurds were elected tom parliament and some became ministers, but these Turkified Kurds could not form specifically Kurdish parties, and they still cannot today. Instead, everyone was obliged to embrace the official ideology and subscribe to Ataturk's famous message, "happy is the man who calls himself a Turk" (Nicole and Huge Pope, 1997:251). As a result, one should question the accuracy and democratic values of the Turkish political system and how the Kurds became, over-night, second-class citizens in their homeland?

The Kurdish national movement

The Kurdish national movement in Turkey took a long time to recover from the military defeats and devastation of the 1920s and 1930s (Kendal, 1982: 72). When it occurred, the central factor was behind the rebirth of the Kurdish nationalist movement, perhaps ironically, was the general resurgence in Turkish political life during the 1960s, which followed the coup of May 1960. Since the establishment of the Turkish republic in 1923, the armed forces have considered themselves its guardian. 'Kemalism' the praetorian political doctrine that began with Kemal Ataturk himself asserts that the military has both the right and the responsibility to intervene in affairs of state, when absolutely necessary in order to guarantee the system's continuance. The military junta established by the coup makers executed or imprisoned hundreds of right-wingers in 1961, and brought in a new and surprisingly democratic constitution. But military was unable to bring about political and social stability. For a brief moment during this period the need of the 1960 junta to repress the Right allowed the Left a breathing space.

Turkish Kurdistan was deeply affected by the political hothouse of 1960s Turkish politics. Confused political and organizational links developed between the movements in Turkey and Kurdish intellectuals who had been educated and radicalized in the so-called 'Turkish Spring' (Bozarslan, 1992: 97-8). Crucially, this new situation confused intellectual leftist renaissance occurred at the time when Turkey's Kurdish population was both more mobile and more susceptible to influence from regions to the West. Migratory movements, which were intensified by industrialization, ultra-rapid means of communication and the massive presence of Kurdish students in major Turkish towns, together with a more heterogeneous political environment were crucial in transforming East-West relation in Turkey. Indeed, the Kurdish nationalist movement went through the same phase of opposition intellectual publishing that its Turkish comrades had during the late 1950s and 1960s, with bilingual journals and other publications (Kutschera, 1979: 94-95). Then in 1965 the first Kurdish nationalist organization since the fall of Dersim was formed - the Democratic Party of Turkish Kurdistan (Vanly, 1986: 64). The relevance of the PDKT as an organized force aside, there can be no argument about the significance of the social and political issues that began it part in the late 1960s. At their core, these involved the role of both traditional leaders and intellectuals in the Kurdish national movement and the relationship of the national movement itself towards the international working-class movement. Perhaps what damaged the PDKT more than anything else was its inability to keep up with the rapid radicalization occurring among Kurdish workers and intellectuals during the late 1960s. Indeed, the PDKT failed to became a popular Kurdish political organization (the party was modelled on the Iraqi KDP) and that led to the emergence of more radical and militant Kurdish organizations in the years to come. At the time, it is also important to mention that the KDP was waging a highly successful guerrilla war against the Ba'athist authorities in Baghdad.

In the article "Nationalism and Secession", B. C. Smith contends that "nationalism is often a weapon which regional elites use in their competition for national political power". And he makes a general conclusion: "appeals to ethnic loyalties to build a sustain political support may be a consequences of a struggle for power between ethnic elites, rather than a cause of mobilization on the part of minority groups" (Smith, 1992: 292). In contrast, the revival of Kurdish nationalism and the emergence of an ethnic awareness among the Kurds have clashed with the regional interests of the Kurdish ruling class. It seems clear that conservative and traditional Kurdish notables still based in the countryside would not necessarily share the views of urbanized and politicalized Kurds youths. Thus, unlike Smith's view, the Kurdish nationalism is not a toll in the hands of regional elites to use in their competition for national political power. The growth of the Kurdish nationalist movement in 1980s and 1990s, led by the Kurdistan Workers Party, known under its Kurdish acronym, PKK, has challenged the very structure of the state and its legitimizing Kemalist ideology.