Printer-friendly VersionBy Azad Aslan
Globe Editorial
From the Ergenekon case to the Kurdish national question, from the issue of EU relations to the relation with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and the global economic crisis and its possible impact on Turkish economy, are some of the most urgent issues and questions that Turkey currently faces.
The local elections in that sense were a testing ground for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to verify whether it performed well or not. The election results indicate that while the AKP managed to preserve its majority position in Turkish politics (gaining approximately 38.9% of the votes), nonetheless it has lost a considerable amount of municipalities particularly in Kurdish areas of Turkey.
Prior to the election, AKP competed fiercely against the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) in Kurdistan of Turkey and explicitly vowed to take Diyarbakir from DTP. The election results in major Kurdish cities are an indicator that the AKP failed to sufficiently sway the Kurdish electorate as the overwhelming majority of votes went to DTP. In Diyarbakir, DTP managed to attain 67% the total votes against 31% of the AKP.
The success of the DTP in the local elections in Kurdish areas is very important and needs to be evaluated properly. DTP's victory once again confirmed that for the peaceful solution of the Kurdish national question in Turkey to materialize, DTP must be taken as a political actor and without which proper and long lasting solution to the question will not be possible. In other words both the Turkish state and the AKP government must engage seriously with DTP, if they really have an underlining desire to resolve the Kurdish national question.
Equally pertinent is the fact that DTP from now on faces crucial policy options in order to play its role as a political actor in Kurdish political affairs and in the proper democratic solution of the Kurdish question. DTP can and must also play active role in developing friendly and proper relations between the KRG and Turkey.
As the majority of the Kurdish people placed their trust upon the DTP then it is a historical duty of DTP to realize this trust by contributing to the solution of the Kurdish national question through available diplomatic channels and via democratic means and methods. For this to happen, it is essential for the DTP to distance itself from the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and its campaign of armed-resistance. This does not mean that DTP should simply denounce the PKK as the Turkish establishment pressures DTP to do so, but rather it must use its influence, prestige and popularity to channel the Kurdish national question towards a mass, civil and democratic struggle.
The next five years will be a decisive period for the DTP as it runs over 98 municipalities, including 8 provinces mostly in Kurdish dominated areas. Alongside this strong municipal representation, the DTP has been active in the Turkish Assembly. The combination of these two platforms, has contributed to the promotion of the DTP as the ultimate Kurdish voice in Turkey and the most recognized Kurdish political actor.
Because of this newly-found reality, the DTP must seize on this opportunity and concentrate on how to improve general Kurdish national interests in the Kurdistan of Turkey, with the knowledge that it has no room for serious mistakes. Today, the DTP in terms of its representation is ahead of the PKK and has better chance to be a recognized political representative of the Kurdish nation in Turkey. This unique character of the DTP should not be consumed within the shadow of PKK and with petty local politics.
The DTP must refrain from petty and unnecessary aggressive and reactionary policies such as demonstrated in Mus province when it lost the election. Aggressive and reactionary policies would only serve those circles in the Turkish establishment who wish to diminish the democratic and legitimate character of Kurdish national movement.
The DTP must realize that the majority of the Kurdish people did not cast their vote due to DTP's political discourse or the rhetoric of the PKK. In other words, the Kurdish people have not bought the idea of a 'democratic republic' put forward by PKK or DTP's intention to Turkification (Turkiyelilesmek) of legitimate Kurdish national question. The majority of Kurdish people voted for the DTP partly because there were not any other alternatives and partly due to Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan's ultra nationalist rhetoric against the Kurds. Prior to election, Erdogan threatened the Kurds by saying 'either love it or leave it'. The Kurds responded to Erdogan's Turkish nationalist and reactionary rhetoric in the election by casting their vote to the DTP.
The DTP should develop a national policy and be able to separate legitimate Kurdish national rights from that of minority rights. In other words Kurdish national question is a political and sovereignty question. DTP can develop two different Kurdish policies in Turkey. For the millions of Kurds that immigrated to western parts of Turkey, DTP must insist on their minority rights, such as right to education in mother tongue. But for the Kurds that reside in Kurdistan, the question is not one of minority rights but the right to sovereignty. This is on the premise that the Kurds must share sovereignty and have equal national rights with that of the Turks. Because of this alone the DTP must distant itself from PKK's political objective which reduce legitimate Kurdish national rights to that of individual-cultural rights.
DTP must be able to use the next five years efficiently and its role in Turkish Assembly in the next three years properly in order to be a genuine and legitimate representative of the Kurdish nation.
Running 98 municipalities, DTP must pursue an open and transparent administration free from corruption in order effectively use available resources to improve the living condition of these poor Kurdish regions.
Efficient, transparent and democratic administration of these municipalities accompanied with democratic principles and democratic mass struggle can secure better opportunities for the Kurdish national movement.
Such national, democratic and civil development in north Kurdistan would also eventually serve for the interests of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and the legitimate institutions that are currently established in Kurdistan.