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Mustafa Barzani himself was influenced by the socialist thought during his long stay in the Soviet Union. File Photo

This can clearly be seen in the previous Kurdistan Democratic Party program. Following his return from the Soviet Union, Barzani emphasized and fought more for the autonomy of southern Kurdistan and less for the united independent Kurdistan. Here we can see the traces of Soviet influence on Barzani: real-politic.

Mustafa Barzani was one of the most prominent Kurdish nationalist leaders of the 20th century. He will be remembered among the ranks of the greatest Kurdish leaders such as Sheikh Abdulselam Barzan, Sheikh Mahmoud Berzenji, Sheikh Said, Qazi Muhammed, Seyyid Riza, and Ali Sher.

Barzani represented a tradition within the Kurdish political history, in effect, the traditional Kurdish national movements led by religious families in Kurdistan since the late 19th century. By the 19th century, the semi-independent status of the Kurdish princes came to an end as a result of the Ottoman centralization policy. This was mainly attributable to the evident decline of the empire from the early 18th century. The fundamental problem for the Ottoman central state was that all over the empire, tribal chiefs and provincial notables had gained semi-independent status. Local notables and provincial chieftains became so strong that the central government was forced in 1808 by the Sened-i Ittifak to recognize their power and confirm their status. It was evident that most of these local notables failed to submit the requested taxes to the capital. This was a serious problem for the treasury, especially as it was combined with the loss of territory in the western part of the empire, which further strained the treasury. This was not the only problem that the Ottomans faced in the 18th century. The expansion of capitalist Europe on all fronts of the empire, humiliation of the Ottoman army by Russia in the second half of the century, the rise of nationalist feelings in the Balkans in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, and the advance of Muhammed Ali, the governor of Egypt, toward Anatolia, were other developments that worried the Ottomans. Something had to be done in order to revive the empire. To solve the deficit problem, the collection of taxes had to be carried out effectively, thus re-centralization of the imperial administration was the logical conclusion that determined the Ottoman policy in the 19th century. Removal of hereditary and semi-independent rulers was imperative, and in Kurdistan this meant abolition of the principalities.

As a result of the centralization policy in the first half of the 19th century, over 80 insurrections broke out. But they were all, one by one, suppressed, and their leaders were either killed or exiled to remote parts of the empire. Having suppressed the uprisings, the Ottoman State confiscated the properties of these princes and would not let them return back to their lands.

The suppression of the 19th-century uprisings had serious consequences in both the political and the social life of Kurdistan. With the destruction of principalities, the political structure of Kurdistan was further fragmented into smaller units. As the Ottoman central administration failed to fill the vacuum created by the removed princes, inner-tribal conflict had begun riddling Kurdistan. Chaos and anarchy became widespread. The Mirs were part of the balance of power as they mediated between tribes and tribal sections in their territory. Because they were eliminated, unrestricted inner-tribal conflicts arose all over Kurdistan. Religious figures, especially Sheikhs, began to rise and obtained a prominent role in Kurdish social and political life as they gradually filled the vacuum created. As spiritual leaders, they were beyond tribal kinship and became perfect candidates to play the role of mediators, so in due course they seized power for their own advantages.

The rise of Sheikhly families to prominence in the social and political life of Kurdistan has led some scholars to analyze the relation between religion and Kurdish nationalism. Jwadieh has pointed out that the tariqas' involvement with nationalism was a significant development in the history of Kurdish nationalism "for a number of reasons, the importance of the takiyahs (tariqas) as centers for the dissemination of nationalist ideas can scarcely be exaggerated. The ideas emanating from these focal points found ready and wide acceptance among the Kurds. For they bore the stamp of the great learning and unimpeachable religious authority of the Sheikhs. Moreover, the religious character and influence of the Sheikhs gave the takiyahs relative immunity from interference and harassment by the authorities." Jwadieh was right to argue that the Sheikhs had great influence on the social and political life of the Kurds. Their influence was weightier than that of the urbanized Kurdish elite in Istanbul. However, the nationalist character of the Sheikhs must be questioned. As Jwadieh himself indicated, Sheikhs "both by training and conviction (?) stood for the traditional Islamic state as opposed to the modern secular state envisaged by the Young Turks." Their preconception with the Islamic state and Caliphate inevitably impeded them from involvement in the development of nationalist politics.

It must be noted that the Sheikhs' involvement with the question of identity and ethnicity, although within the context of an Islamic state, nevertheless at times came near to nationalist discourse. This was the case for Sheikh Abdulselam Barzan. In a petition sent to the Porte and the Ottoman parliament in Istanbul, Sheikh Abdulselam Barzan requested the following reforms:

1-The adoption of Kurdish as the official language in the five Kurdish qadahs (administrative districts).

2-The adoption of Kurdish as the language of instruction in the Kurdish areas.

3-The appointment of Kurdish-speaking qaimmaqams, mudirs of Nahiyas, and other officials.

4-The administration of law and justice in accordance with the Shariat, in view of the fact that Islam is the state religion.

5-The positions of qadi (religious judges) and mufti (cannon lawyers responsible for delivering formal legal opinions) to be filled by adherents of the Shafi-i school of law.

6-Taxes to be levied in accordance with the provisions of the Shariat, and the abolition of all taxes which are in excess of or incompatible with the amounts established by the Shariat.

7-Taxes collected for exemption from labour service to remain in effect, provided they are set aside for the repair and maintenance of roads in the five Kurdish qadahs.

This petition is highly significant for two reasons: First, in one of the most remote parts of Kurdistan, a religious leader was in search of regional autonomy albeit colored with religion. In that sense he was ahead of, in terms of nationalist discourse, the urbanized Kurdish elite in Istanbul who were preoccupied with Ottomanism. Second, it also demonstrates the complexity of the periodization of Kurdish nationalism. Even though the petition was not a manifestation of Kurdish nationalism, nevertheless it carried some of the basic nationalist elements, in effect, self-administration (article 3) and use of national language in education and instruction. What made it fall short of a fully nationalist discourse was its failure, resulting from their religious beliefs, to envisage a state of their own. In other words, the Ottoman State was conceived as a legitimate institution.

It would not be incorrect to state that Sheikh Abdulselam Barzan was one of the earlier pioneers of Kurdish nationalism. His reforms in 1907 in Barzan region, in effect, abolishing private property, land reform, establishing councils, etc., indicated that he had a vision that was far from his time. He was the mentor of Mustafa Barzani.

From 1940s until his death in 1975, Mustafa Barzani stamped the Kurdish national movement not only in southern Kurdistan but in other parts as well. Barzani was influential particularly among the rural Kurdish community and traditionally educated Kurdish elite. His influence gradually eroded in north Kurdistan due to the advent of the Kurdish left that was mainly affected by the rise of Turkish socialism.

Socialism and Marxist-Leninist thought in Kurdistan in the early 1970s, which was combined with the speed of urbanization, brought a conflict within Kurdish politics--a conflict of modernism versus tradition. Those segments of Kurdish urban intelligentsia who were mainly influenced by the entry of leftist ideas assumed the traditional Kurdish leadership as backward and depicted them as a barrier, an obstacle to be overcome for the interests of the Kurdish national liberation movement. Proliferation of leftist Kurdish political organizations, which were Stalinist and Maoist in orientation, throughout Kurdistan in the '70s had not only caused the erosion of political influence of the traditional Kurdish leaders but at the same time had prepared the ground for a new phenomenon in Kurdish politics: the phenomenon of internal conflict between the Kurdish political establishments. The period from '70s to the late '90s observed serious bloody conflict between leading Kurdish organisations.

Despite their modernist discourse, most of the newly appeared leftist Kurdish political parties and organizations failed to develop a cohesive Kurdish national politics, but rather involved themselves in never-ending theoretical discussion of Marxist thought. It would be appropriate to include here that their Marxist thought was limited to only those interpretations of Turkish, Persian, and Arab socialism. It is therefore not surprising to observe that the Kurdish leftist intelligentsia reflected mainstream ideas of Turkish, Arabic, and Persian socialism rather than emphasizing the specific social and political conditions of Kurdistan and developing national policies accordingly. Apart from a very few examples, such as Rizgari (est. 1976 in north Kurdistan, for example) most of the Kurdish leftist organizations described Mustafa Barzani as a 'collaborator' of imperialism and a 'feudal lord'. They clearly declared one of their primary aim as to eliminate tribalism in Kurdistan. This explains the reason behind the first armed struggle of PKK that was launched against not the Turkish military establishment but a Kurdish tribe, the Bucaks. Such pseudo-Marxist interpretation of Kurdish modernists itself became a barrier before the cohesion of Kurdish national movement. What sets Mustafa Barzani apart from others was that he based his movement on the Kurdish cultural values. This explains why he was so popular with the Kurdish people, particularly among the rural community. Supporters, critics and opponents of Mustafa Barzani so far have failed to emphasise this aspect of Barzani movement. Mustafa Barzani's insistence on Kurdish cultural values in combination and in continuation with Sheikh Albdulselam Barzani's great reforms explains the hundred years long continous struggle in southern Kurdistan.

Mustafa Barzani himself was influenced by the socialist thought during his long stay in the Soviet Union. This can clearly be seen in the previous Kurdistan Democratic Party program. Following his return from the Soviet Union, Barzani emphasized and fought more for the autonomy of southern Kurdistan and less for the united independent Kurdistan. Here we can see the traces of Soviet influence on Barzani: real-politic. The concept of real-politic was and still is a very popular term among the Kurdish political figures. Convinced that a united independent Kurdistan under the then-international political conditions was not possible, he may have hoped that he could at least gain autonomy for the south part of Kurdistan. He indeed succeeded in it. However, the experience of autonomy did not last long due to the issue of Kirkuk. He did not give up on Kirkuk and fought a bitter war against the Baath regime.

Here one can observe one of the most crucial legacies of Mustafa Barzani: his insistence in holding on to the territory of Kurdistan. He did not bargain on the territory and faced the defeat. It is this heritage that the Kurds today proudly stick to Kirkuk and will not give up despite the international and regional pressure and threats.

The struggle and endeavour of Mustafa Barzani had taken in a period of Cold War, which the politics in the Middle East was in deadlock in terms of balance of power and radical changes. His political vision had been shaped and transformed within the climax of polarized world politics of capitalism vs socialism and its sideeffect in the Middle East.

Alteration of Mustafa Barzani's political objective, from independence to autonomy, following his return from Soivet Union to Iraq in 1958 can be justified within the context of callous Cold War politics and the balance of power that existed in the Middle East.

The world politics today, however, changed considerably. Soviet Union was collapsed. The World capitalist powers in a bitter struggle for a new political and economic hegomony. In a multi-polarized world and ever extending regional conflicts of the 21st century there is no balance of powers, there is no status quo left. In a world of bloody chaos and war new opportunities and new revolutionary changes are also possible. The Kurds, therefore, develop a new vision, a new mentality which must reflect the political conditions of the century.

Mustafa Barzani was a legendary Kurdsih national leader. It is not enough for the Kurds, however, to follow the footstep of Barzani but they continue from where he left as he passed away.

As long as the Kurds remain an oppressed nation, the legacy of Mustafa Barzani will remain with them. It must also be remembered that the legacy and struggle of Mustafa Barzani is not the property of Kurdistan Democratic Party or his family but belongs to the whole Kurdish nation.